For years, cybersecurity strategy has been framed largely as a contest of prevention: stronger perimeters, better detection, fewer vulnerabilities. That work remains essential. But prevention alone cannot be the whole strategy, because no organization can guarantee that every attack will be stopped. The more useful question for executives is not only "How do we keep attackers out?" but "When something gets through, can we keep delivering the services that matter most, and recover them with confidence?"
That question is the heart of cyber resilience. This article explains what it means in practice, why it requires a business-led view rather than a purely technical one, and how organizations can prepare critical services to withstand cyber disruption. It is written for CISOs, CIOs, and the executives they brief.
When ransomware strikes, the first question many executives ask is, "Do we have backups?" It is a reasonable question, but it is not the most important one. The harder questions are whether those backups are intact, whether they are free of the attacker's tools, which point in time can be trusted, what must be rebuilt before anything can be restored, and how the organization will know a restored system is safe to reconnect.
Clean restoration needs more than backups. It requires a recovery capability designed for an adversary who may have been inside the environment for some time, may have targeted backup systems deliberately, and may try to return. This article explains what that capability involves and how organizations can prepare for it. It is written for CIOs, CISOs, and the infrastructure and recovery leaders who would carry out the work.
Most organizations test their technology. They run vulnerability scans, penetration tests, backup restores, and failover drills. Far fewer test the decisions that determine how a serious cyber incident unfolds: when to disconnect a business unit, whether to take a customer-facing service offline, who determines whether an incident is material, what to tell customers and regulators, and when it is safe to resume. Those decisions are made by executives, often with incomplete information and under intense time pressure. When they have never been rehearsed, even a strong technical response can be undermined by delay, confusion, or conflicting instructions.
This article explains how to design exercises that connect technical response with executive action, so that leaders practice the decisions that matter before they face them for real. It is written for CISOs, crisis and continuity leaders, and the executives who would sit at the table.