On 16 November 2026, the UK House of Lords National Resilience Committee published its report, Are we ready? Building a culture of resilience (HL Paper 79). Its conclusion is blunt. In the Committee's words, the UK is "seriously underprepared" for the growing and interconnected risks it faces, and the Government must act urgently. Launching the report, the Committee's Chair, Baroness Coussins, said: "The world is more turbulent and insecure than it has been for decades."
The report is about national preparedness in the United Kingdom, but its central findings will be familiar to any operational resilience leader: plans that address single events rather than cascading ones, fragmented ownership, fragile supply chains, untested assumptions, and a private sector that is not fully part of the plan. This article summarizes what the Committee found and recommended, then offers OpResONE's perspective on what US and global organizations can take from it. The summary is drawn from the Committee's published report and press release; the commentary is ours. OpResONE is not affiliated with, and this article is not endorsed by, the UK Parliament.
Why this matters
National resilience and organizational resilience are two views of the same system. The infrastructure, logistics and supply chains that a country relies on are largely run by businesses, and the report says so directly: businesses "operate most of the infrastructure, logistics and supply chains on which the country depends." When a government asks whether the nation is ready, it is really asking whether thousands of organizations, and the dependencies between them, are ready.
The report's summary describes a risk landscape that most leaders will recognize. It notes that attempted cyber-attacks on the UK's defence system already exceed 90,000 a year, and it cites the Director of MI5's warning that AI is "supercharging" risks ranging from cyber-attacks to the development of biological weapons. It also points to threats to undersea cables and pipelines "on which our communications and energy flows depend."
The Committee's most important observation is about how organizations plan. According to the report, current resilience plans tend to address one type of crisis at a time, such as a power outage, a disruption to water supplies, a cyber-attack or collapsing infrastructure, "but not the 'polycrisis' of multiple emergencies happening simultaneously or cascading into one another." That is a planning gap many private-sector programs share.
The business challenge: what the Committee found
The Committee's findings, as set out in its summary and press release, fall into five themes.
1. Plans exist, but they do not connect. The report observes that the UK is not starting from scratch. There are "dozens of committees, strategies, action plans and frameworks" with resilience in the title. The problem is that most of them "don't link up with the others," which produces overlap and duplication without much consistency. The Committee also concludes that "the existence of plans and frameworks is not, by itself, evidence of preparedness," and warns that plans must not become "tick-box" exercises.
2. Leadership and coordination are fragmented. According to the press release, fragmented leadership and coordination prevent national plans from being turned consistently into practical action across Government and at local level.
3. Supply chains are exposed. The report describes limited domestic production and stockpiles of vital products, including food and medicines. Among the facts the Committee highlights: the UK imports 80% of the active ingredient for penicillin antibiotics from China, the last domestic antibiotic manufacturing plant closed in 2025, and just nine retailers account for around 94.5% of food sold through UK supermarkets. The Committee calls for a shift from a "just-in-time" approach to being "just-in-case."
4. Businesses sit on the fringes. The report finds that the private sector is not adequately integrated into national and local resilience planning, and that businesses' representation in resilience structures has been "inconsistent or ignored." It also notes that too many businesses appear insufficiently engaged and that decisions by Government and business give too little weight to long-term systemic risks.
5. Risk communication has been too cautious. The press release says the Government has not communicated national risks openly or consistently enough. The summary goes further, saying the Government "should stop being squeamish" about telling the public plainly about the threats the country faces, and that evidence suggests people would respond with trust rather than alarm.
The Committee also makes a cost argument. It states that recovery from cyber-attacks alone already costs the UK £14.7 billion a year, and that the costs of effective preparedness are markedly lower than the costs of putting things right after a disaster. As the summary puts it, "Prevention is better–and cheaper–than cure."
Key concept: the Committee's recommendations
The Committee's recommendations are aimed at the UK Government. The headline recommendations in its press release include:
- Leadership and accountability: appoint a Cabinet minister responsible solely for resilience, supported by a Chief Resilience Officer at Permanent Secretary level. The report adds an annual statement on resilience to Parliament by the Prime Minister, and asks for the minister to be appointed within six months of the report's publication.
- A single national resilience strategy: with clear responsibilities, common standards and measurable objectives, so that national, regional and local plans work together and are regularly tested. The report asks the Cabinet Office to establish it within six months.
- Stronger local arrangements: regional coordination centres, and a statutory footing and sustainable funding for Local Resilience Forums.
- Less dependence on vulnerable supply chains: stronger domestic production and strategic reserves of essential supplies, particularly medicines, food and agricultural inputs, and more diverse international supply arrangements.
- Preparedness duties for business: proportionate resilience requirements for businesses, statutory duties for those essential to national resilience, and regular cross-sector stress testing to find weaknesses before emergencies occur.
- Cyber resilience: wider cyber security regulation, adequately resourced regulators and stronger domestic expertise in cyber security and emerging technologies.
- Public preparedness: building on the Government's three-year Be Ready campaign with a preparedness booklet for every household, a multilingual emergency app and resilience education throughout life.
- Communications in emergencies: tested backup communications arrangements, and abandoning plans to switch off Digital Terrestrial Television.
- International commitments: publishing UK performance against NATO's seven civil preparedness baseline requirements and explaining how gaps will be addressed.
Two recommendations deserve particular attention from business leaders. First, the report proposes a tiered framework for business resilience. Tier 1 would cover businesses essential to national resilience, subject to statutory preparedness and continuity duties and regular stress tests. Tier 2 would use contractual arrangements to set resilience requirements for organizations that do not need statutory duties. Tier 3 would support the wider business community, including SMEs, with voluntary guidance, incentives and opportunities to join planning and exercising.
Second, the report recommends that the Government apply the stress-testing approach used in the financial sector to national resilience, with regular cross-sector stress tests for critical sectors such as food, energy and water, and pharmaceuticals. The Committee says exercising should be demanding enough to show "where plans, systems and cross-sector dependencies break down," and endorses the idea of a safe environment in which organizations can "fail and learn."
The report also proposes a statutory duty on private and public sector organizations to conduct routine stress-testing exercises, and a national resilience course for senior leaders modelled on Finland's national defence courses.
What organizations should do
The remainder of this article is OpResONE's commentary, not the Committee's.
Whether or not the UK adopts these recommendations, the report is a useful checklist for any organization, in any country. Five practical steps follow from it.
- Plan for cascades, not single events. Review your scenario library. If every scenario starts and ends with one cause, such as a cyber-attack or a facility loss, add scenarios where one disruption triggers another: a cyber incident that becomes a power or transport problem, or a supplier failure that becomes a customer-service crisis.
- Map your dependencies end to end. The report's supply-chain findings are a reminder that concentration risk often sits several layers down. Identify the critical services you deliver, the people, technology, facilities, data and third parties they rely on, and where a single supplier, region or route could stop them.
- Test to find the breaking point. The Committee's call for exercises that let organizations "fail and learn" applies directly. Design exercises that stress decisions, handoffs and dependencies, not just ones that confirm a plan can be read aloud. Track the actions that come out of them to closure.
- Join the wider system. The report finds that businesses sit at the edge of public resilience structures. Know who your local and sector emergency coordinators are, understand what public authorities expect of you in a major disruption, and include key partners and suppliers in your exercises.
- Prepare people, not just plans. The Committee's emphasis on a "culture of resilience" applies inside organizations too. Make sure staff know what is expected of them in a disruption, that communications have tested fallbacks, and that preparedness is part of normal operations rather than an annual event.
Leadership considerations
For boards and executives, the report raises questions worth asking now:
- Who owns resilience? The Committee recommends a single accountable minister and a Chief Resilience Officer for the UK. Does your organization have equally clear ownership, with authority across functions?
- Is our preparedness proven or assumed? The report's warning that plans are not evidence of preparedness applies to boards. Ask for evidence from recent exercises and real incidents, not just confirmation that plans exist.
- Are we weighting long-term risk properly? The Committee says decisions by Government and business give insufficient weight to long-term systemic risks in favour of short-term priorities. Consider whether cost and efficiency decisions, such as single-sourcing or lean inventory, have been tested against prolonged disruption.
- Are we ready for new expectations? If governments move toward tiered resilience duties or cross-sector stress testing, as the report proposes for the UK, organizations that already map, test and evidence their resilience will be better placed. Organizations with UK operations or UK customers should follow the Government's response.
- Are we communicating honestly? The Committee argues that openness builds trust. The same principle applies to how leaders talk with employees, customers and regulators about risk.
How OpResONE can help
OpResONE helps organizations move from plans on paper to resilience they can demonstrate. Our advisory work includes:
- Operational resilience program design: identifying critical services, setting tolerances for disruption and assigning clear ownership.
- Dependency and supply-chain mapping: tracing critical services through technology, facilities, people and third parties to find hidden concentration and single points of failure.
- Scenario testing and exercises: designing cascading, multi-event exercises that test decisions and dependencies, and tracking lessons to completion.
- Governance and reporting: giving boards and executives clear, evidence-based views of readiness.
- Professional development: as an authorized PECB partner, OpResONE delivers training that prepares professionals for PECB certifications in areas such as business continuity. Credentials are awarded by PECB.
- Integrated GRC technology: as an Authorized SwissGRC Channel Partner for the United States and Canada, OpResONE helps organizations bring risk, continuity and resilience information together on one platform.
We bring BRILLIANCE to RESILIENCE®.
Related resources
- Operational Resilience advisory services
- Operational Resilience: Where to Start
- From Plans to Proven Readiness
- Mapping Dependencies Before Disruption
- The Hidden Risk of Concentration
- Read the full report
Request a strategy call
The Committee's question, "Are we ready?", is one every leadership team should be able to answer with evidence. If you want to know how your critical services would hold up in a cascading disruption, talk with OpResONE about where to start.
Sources
- UK Parliament, House of Lords National Resilience Committee, "Government must act urgently to prepare UK for growing risks" (news release, 16 November 2026)
- House of Lords National Resilience Committee, "Are we ready? Building a culture of resilience", Report of Session 2026-27, HL Paper 79 (published 16 November 2026)
- HL Paper 79, Summary
- HL Paper 79, Summary of conclusions and recommendations
- HL Paper 79 (PDF)

