A health system's continuity plan can name generators, evacuation routes, and clinical documentation and still leave a quieter gap: the electronic health record, the imaging archive, the staffing platform, or a clinical decision tool that is owned, hosted, or updated by someone else. When one of those services fails, the event is not only an information-technology outage. It can become a care-continuity, privacy, and AI-governance event at the same time.
Healthcare already has official requirements that touch this gap, even if they were not written as an "AI and vendor resilience" program. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services emergency preparedness condition of participation for hospitals, at 42 CFR 482.15, requires an all-hazards program, a plan reviewed at least every two years, and exercises at least twice a year. The HIPAA Security Rule requires covered entities and their business associates to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information, including through a contingency plan. Neither rule is a complete method for governing clinical AI or a complex vendor estate. Both are reasons not to treat those issues as optional.
This article is about that combined agenda: how hospitals and health systems govern contracted services and AI tools so that care can continue when a vendor or a model fails. It is a reading of the official requirements as they now stand, and of the questions leaders should ask of the third parties and models that sit in the path of care.

